PLACE, PUBLIC MEMORY, AND THE TOKYO AIR RAIDS

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ABSTRACT. The one public memorial built to remember the many people killed in air raids directed against the civilian population of Tokyo during the Asia-Pacific War bears traces of deeper stories related to a prior catastrophe, the effects of the U.S. occupation of Japan, war memory, political power at the municipal and national level, and the ability of citizens’ groups to create public sites of exemplary memory. This article examines key chapters of those stories by tracing the dynamics of collective memory as related to the movement to remember the air raids and build a Tokyo Peace Museum. It concludes with an analysis of the existing memorial as a space of literal memory. Keyword: air raids, exemplary memory, memorials, public memory, Tokyo.

In March 2001 Tokyo’s governor, Ishihara Shintarô,1 presided over the unveiling of a memorial dedicated to civilians killed by the firebombing of Japan’s capital in the final months of the country’s Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945). On the occasion, thousands of bereaved relatives traveled from throughout the metropolis and country to Yokoami Park, site of the newly built structure, the first and only public memorial for Tokyo’s air-raid victims, who numbered more than 100,000. Yet, according to the very citizens’ groups that for decades had lobbied the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) to build such a memorial, the flower-covered, granite Dwelling of Remembrance should not have been erected (Figure 1). At least not in Yokoami Park, they argued, given its status as a sacred space meant to memorialize an entirely different catastrophe, and not without an accompanying museum that recounted and contextualized the experience of the Tokyo air raids. Although a previous governor had committed the city to building a Tokyo Peace Museum, upon assuming office Governor Ishihara erected the memorial as a stand-alone structure.

This article contributes to the growing body of literature on the intersections of urban space, identity, and public memory, particularly as related to the memorialization of catastrophic loss (Sturken 1991, 2008; Young 1992; Johnson 1995; Till 1999; Foote, Tóth, and Árvay 2000; Forest and Johnson 2002; Foote 2003; Giamo 2003; Nevins 2005; Hoskins 2007). As a case study built on the theoretical position that material manifestations of public memory in the urban landscape are a result of mediation among a variety of interest groups and that sites such as museums and memorials play a pivotal role in identity construction, this particular contribution may be read as one answer to the call for scholars to extend studies of the spatial dynamics of memory beyond North America and Europe (Foote and Azaryahu 2007).

Working from the premise articulated by Owen Dwyer and Derek Alderman that “memorials bear traces of deeper stories about how they were created, by whom,

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and for what ideological purpose” (2008, 168), the main portion of this article consists of an examination of the factors that led to the construction of the controversial memorial. I focus on three intersecting factors: a citizens’ movement that emerged in the late 1960s to remember the Tokyo air raids; the political inclinations of Tokyo’s governors and municipal legislators; and the 1990s debate over war memory as related to the construction of peace museums in Japan. The concluding section applies Tzvetan Todorov’s ideal types of literal memory and exemplary memory as a means of interpreting the Dwelling of Remembrance memorial in Yokoami Park (1996). Though to date rarely used by researchers, these ideal types can act as an important analytical lens through which we can better understand a critical feature of memorial sites (Nevins 2005; Hoskins 2007).

Tokyo Air Raids and Public Memory

The most damaging of the more than 100 air raids that Tokyo experienced during the Asia-Pacific War comprised five large-scale firebombing raids between March and May 1945 that collectively destroyed 31 percent of the capital and displaced more than 4 million Tokyoites (Tôkyô-to 1953). Among these incendiary raids, the Great Tokyo Air Raid of 10 March 1945 commands attention for turning the city’s most densely populated area into a sea of fire that killed more than 100,000 civilians (Daniels 1977). Following this catastrophic event, authorities quickly buried the victims in dozens of mass graves, where they remained throughout the early post-war period while the TMG and bereaved relatives feuded over how to deal with the unidentifiable and unclaimed corpses, which constituted a majority of the dead (Tik 1985).

Because the impasse continued, an American made the final decision. In 1948 Lieutenant Commander William Bunce, chief of the Religions Division in the Civil Information and Education Section of the U.S. Occupation’s General Headquarters, directed the TMG to place the air-raid victims’ remains in an existing metropolitan charnel house, Earthquake Memorial Hall (Yamamoto 2001; Osa 2007). This structure, housed in Yokoami Park, held the cremated bodies of many victims of the fires that had destroyed Tokyo in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1 September 1923. Yokoami Park itself constituted a main site of tragedy on that day when the tens of thousands who sought refuge in the 2-hectare open space were set upon by a firestorm. Among the 90,000 Tokyoites killed in 1923, up to 44,000 died at this site alone (Sk 1978).

Given the tragedy associated with Yokoami Park, authorities sanctified it through its conversion into the main memorial space for the 1923 catastrophe. Centered on Earthquake Memorial Hall and an attached charnel house holding the cremated remains of 58,000 unidentifiable and unclaimed victims, by the time of the 1930 ceremony inaugurating the park and celebrating Tokyo’s reconstruction Yokoami Park hosted numerous memorials and Reconstruction Commemoration Hall, a museum featuring exhibits related to the disaster and Tokyo’s reconstruction (Figure 2). Via these structures and memorials the park became the principal com-
memorative space where the city and nation remembered the Great Kanto Earthquake and the many people who had perished in the disaster.

Between 1948 and 1950 the Tokyo Metropolitan Park Division exhumed and cremated the unidentifiable and unclaimed remains of 105,400 air-raid victims. Authorities then placed 450 large porcelain urns containing the ashes in Yokoami Park’s charnel house, which was attached to the officially renamed “Tokyo Metropolitan Memorial Hall.” Since 1951 the Tokyo Memorial Association has sponsored Buddhist services every 10 March and 1 September for the victims of both the 1923 and 1945 catastrophes (Tik 1985).

Except for these services and the establishment of neighborhood-based memorials near areas such as school yards and bridge crossings where many had died on 10 March 1945 (Figure 3), public remembering of the Tokyo air raids did not begin until the late 1960s. The U.S. occupation of Japan constituted the first significant impediment. Similar to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, occupation-era press-censorship codes prevented all public discussion of the firebombing until Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 (Matsuura 1968). Strikingly different from the outpouring of public memories and creation of memorial spaces in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki following the end of this “abnormal interlude of silence,” public remembering of the Tokyo air raids was slow to commence (Dower 1996, 141).
Conservative control of the tmg from the early postwar period until the late 1960s resulted in little official will to remember at the local level. Except for releasing a report in 1953 that detailed physical damage to the capital, the TMG made no effort to remember the destruction of the city, memorialize those killed in the firebombings, or even compile the names of the dead (Tôkyô-to 1953; Hoshino 2001). At the national level, Japan’s cold war alliance with the United States and the pursuit of high economic growth discouraged the country’s political leaders from revisiting the destruction of Tokyo and most of urban Japan. Perhaps the most telling moment of this will to forget occurred in 1965 when Japan’s prime minister awarded U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay, who had orchestrated the firebombing of sixty-four Japanese cities while serving as head of the Army Air Force’s 21st Bomber Command, the country’s highest medal for his assistance in the establishment of the air wing of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (Matsuura 1968). Addressing these “deliberate absences” required a radical shift in political leadership at the local level and the creation of a citizens’ group intent on retrieving memories of the air raids (Cochrane 2006, 5).

Remembering the Tokyo Air Raids

Depending on historical circumstances, local political leaders can play a fundamental role in a city’s development (Flanagan 2004). Tokyo’s governor wields considerable discretionary power, which has allowed him to translate particular convictions into reality, especially during periods of economic growth. Initiating an era of reformist
government in the capital following two decades of postwar conservative leadership, in 1967 Tokyoites elected as governor Minobe Ryôkichi, a public intellectual and self-described “flexible utopian Socialist” (Rix 1975, 533). For the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which by proxy had controlled Tokyo’s administrative apparatus since the 1950s, losing control of Japan’s largest and most important city was a spectacular defeat (jq 1969, 1971).

The LDP’s concern grew all the more acute as the reformist Minobe, governor for three terms from 1967 to 1979, attempted to transform Tokyo “from a city that gives priority to industry to a city centered around people” (jq 1971, 13). In this regard Minobe worked to provide Tokyoites with numerous rights to the city in part by achieving a “civil minimum” via a variety of initiatives—including health insurance for the elderly, neonatal care, and pollution-control measures—financed by Japan’s strong economic growth and the attendant increase in tax revenues paid by Tokyo-based corporations (Muramatsu 1997; Hein 2004).

Minobe’s tenure also witnessed the emergence of numerous citizens’ groups in Tokyo that addressed quality-of-life issues, including “efficient garbage disposal, protection of the citizens’ right to sunshine and opposition to highway building projects on environmental grounds” (jq 1975, 184). In 1970 another citizens’ group emerged when a dozen public intellectuals and air-raid survivors formed the Soci-

Fig. 3—A neighborhood-based memorial dedicated to victims of the Great Tokyo Air Raid of 10 March 1945, Sumida Ward, Tokyo. (Photograph by the author, August 2009)
The Society for Recording the Tokyo Air Raids. While Tokyo’s expressways and skyscrapers continued to multiply, the society stated in a letter to the governor, the city and the written record contained few reminders of the air raids that had destroyed Tokyo and killed so many people. In contrast to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, argued the group, no official effort had been made to collect survivors’ testimonies and air-raid–related documents. With the TMG’s financial backing, the group proposed a multiyear project to carry out such an endeavor. As the quarter-century mark of the war’s end approached, representatives of the society met with Governor Minobe in August 1970, after which he offered full financial backing, a support staff, and office space in order for the group to realize its proposal (Saotome 1982).

The Tokyo Peace Museum

With the Society for Recording the Tokyo Air Raids acting as catalyst and model, residents in forty cities throughout Japan also formed citizens’ groups to begin to recover memories and documents related to the air raids they had experienced (Saitô H. 1980). Two years later, members of the nationwide Society for Recording Air Raids and War Damages pledged to work toward the construction of “war-damage resource museums” meant to convey the experience of the air raids (Imai 1981; my translation). In Tokyo the newly established Society to Build an Air Raid and War Damage Museum solicited TMG support to construct both a museum and a memorial dedicated to firebombing victims (as 1974). Although Governor Minobe favored the proposal and provided funds for acquisition of exhibit materials, a precipitous decrease in Tokyo’s tax revenues resulting from the global oil shock of 1973 prevented him from committing the resources required to secure a site and build the structures (Saotome 1982).

The TMG’s support for the project, moreover, halted following Tokyo’s 1979 gubernatorial election. Although the winning candidate, Suzuki Shun’ichi, a longtime LDP politician and bureaucrat, voiced enthusiasm during the campaign for what some called the “Tokyo Metropolitan Peace Memorial Museum” (referred to as the “Tokyo Peace Museum”), after assuming office he refused to fund its construction (Futatabi 1985).

Scholars have debated whether Tokyo fits the criteria assigned to a global city and the proportionate roles that state and capital have played in the redevelopment process that led the metropolis to be ascribed as such, but they agree that Tokyo underwent a significant spatial reconfiguration beginning in the 1980s (White 1998; Hill and Kim 2000; Fujita 2003; A. Saito 2003; Waley 2007). Although largely unexamined in the Tokyo-as-global-city literature, Governor Suzuki played a central role in this transformation (Iwatake 1993; A. Saito 2003). A brief explanation of this point will illuminate his resistance to build the Tokyo Peace Museum.

Despite having stated his intention to embrace the “local-autonomy” approach toward governance that his predecessor, Minobe, had popularized, once in office Suzuki realigned the TMG with the central government’s ruling LDP and its economic policies (Iwatake 1993). In this regard, Suzuki worked in tandem with then
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who had decided to stimulate internal consumption via massive investment in public-private development projects (Yasuda 1988). Turning away from Governor Minobe’s approach to Tokyo as a life space in which the local government prioritized the needs of citizens, Suzuki viewed the city primarily as an economic space meant to accommodate the many corporations that used Japan’s capital as a center for their global operations (Hill and Kim 2000; Sorenson 2003). As a main member of the troika composed of the TMG, the central government, and private enterprise, Suzuki often took the lead in the effort to transform Tokyo into a “vast container for capital accumulations” by enabling corporate expansion through land speculation and large-scale development projects (Oizumi 1994, 209).

Following the national government’s deregulation of the urban real estate market and the abolition of building-restriction codes in the 1980s, Tokyo witnessed rapid increases in land prices, which fueled a growing real estate bubble that originated in the center of the capital and quickly enveloped the entire city and much of the country (Machimura 2003; A. Saito 2003; Waley 2007; Shibata 2008). Resulting tax revenues pouring into the TMG’s coffers allowed Suzuki to build numerous “architectural projections of power” central to his vision of a global city (Coaldrake 1996, 274). These included: the Edo-Tokyo Museum, the largest metropolitan museum in the world; the New Tokyo Metropolitan Government Headquarters, “the largest single set of buildings to be constructed in Japan in the twentieth century” (Coaldrake 1996, 266); and the massive public-private Tokyo Waterfront Sub-Center development built on reclaimed portions of Tokyo Bay (Yasuda 1988; Oizumi 1994; Sand 2001). While embarking on these and other monumental projects, Suzuki ignored repeated demands made throughout the 1980s that he build the Tokyo Peace Museum, an act that would contradict his vision of transforming Tokyo into a depoliticized global city known for its cultural amenities, attractiveness to capital, and position as the center of one of the world’s greatest economic powers (Futatabi 1985; Iwatake 1993; Saitô H. 2001).

Suzuki, however, lost significant political power following his fourth and final election as governor in 1991. In addition to his estrangement from the central government’s ruling LDP, which had opposed his reelection bid, a coalition of liberal parties took control of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly and pressed the governor to build the Tokyo Peace Museum. Acceding to the assembly’s demands, in 1992 Suzuki announced the directive to plan the structure and pledged to complete the design phase by March 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the Great Tokyo Air Raid (AS 1992).

A gubernatorial advisory committee composed of TMG assemblymen and bureau managers, professors, writers, and architects planned the museum over the following two years. In its final report, the committee stated the museum’s size and contents would make it deserving of its designation as “Tokyo’s twenty-first-century symbol of peace” (Tôkyô-to 1994, 2; my translation). With an exhibition area centered on the experience of the Tokyo air raids anchoring the building, the museum would also
feature additional exhibits, a 500-seat lecture and concert hall, meeting rooms, a reference library, and even a gift shop (Tōkyō-to 1993).

As for the museum’s location, the governor’s office announced a candidate site, close to the city center, on a portion of land in Chūō Ward newly designated as “Ôkawabata River City,” then under joint redevelopment by the TMG and the Mitsui Real Estate Group (as 1993). Although the gubernatorial advisory committee stated that it could not grant the requests for the separate charnel house outside Yokoami Park that some community members had demanded, it pledged to build a memorial dedicated to the air-raid victims next to the museum (Tōkyō-to 1993; Yamamoto 2001).

Importantly, the Tokyo Peace Museum, via its proposed exhibits and comparable to other peace museums built in Japan in the 1990s, would attempt to challenge and transcend the “national victimology” discourse that had dominated public war memory for decades. In the 1950s Japan had embraced a national identity in relation to the Asia-Pacific War based on the notion of Japanese victimization due to the country’s exceptional status, repeated mantra-like over the years, as “the only nation ever to have been atom-bombed” (Orr 2001, 1). The atomic destruction of two Japanese cities facilitated a narrative of victimhood and suffering that simultaneously obscured the devastating results of Japanese wartime aggression and exonerated both the Japanese state and its people from their actions (Field 1997; Yoneyama 1999; Giamo 2003).

“Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” wrote the historian John Dower, “became a way of forgetting Nanjing, Bataan, the Burma-Siam railway, Manila, and the countless Japanese atrocities these and other place names signified to non-Japanese” (1996, 123). The large-scale suffering and urban devastation caused by air raids on sixty-four Japanese cities, however, never became an integral part of the “national victimology” that determined public war memory because Japan could not claim an exclusive experience. In addition to the many residents in cities throughout Europe that were affected by air raids during World War II, civilians suffered heavily as Japanese Imperial Navy bombers carried out indiscriminate attacks on cities throughout China (Peattie 2001; Maeda 2006).

Beginning in the late 1980s, however, Japan experienced a “shifting economy of self-understanding as victims and aggressors” (Field 1997, 2), in part due to “a growing sense of urgency about fixing the meaning of the war in national memory” (Hammond 1997, 101). Museums became an important site of this memory fixing, especially in terms of whether they should recall only a selective suffering experienced within the Japanese national space or go beyond borders to consider large-scale suffering inflicted by the Japanese state and people (RKK 1995; Hammond 1997; Smith 2002). In this regard, the countrywide emergence of peace museums, a concept that originated in early-twentieth-century Europe and that Japan has embraced more than any other country, constitutes a fundamental aspect of this shift (Duffy 1993; Buruma 1994; Seltz 2004; Hein and Takenaka 2007). In addition to focusing on the urban devastation and suffering experienced in Japan, these peace museums, which most prominently include the Osaka International Peace Center (or Peace...
Osaka), Ritsumeikan University’s Museum for World Peace in Kyoto, Peace Aichi in Aichi Prefecture, and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, sought to challenge the prevalent “victim consciousness” by expanding the geography of wartime memory through a critical appraisal of Japanese aggression and atrocities committed during the Asia-Pacific War. To one extent or another, each peace museum attempts to upset the normative production of an official war memory that exclusively focuses on Japanese suffering.

Peace Osaka, for example, in addition to a gallery that offers a detailed account of the Osaka air raids, contains an equally large exhibition space dedicated to an in-depth discussion of Japan’s invasion, colonization, and annexation of parts the Asian continent, the emergence of and reprisals against Korean and Chinese resistance movements, and the carrying out of numerous state-sanctioned atrocities by Japanese troops. Similarly, the Tokyo Peace Museum’s pedagogical function as outlined in the proposed exhibits would include a discussion of Japan’s “wars of invasion” in its “Path to the Tokyo Air Raids” display (Figure 4), with a suggested focus on the Japanese Imperial Navy’s air raids on Chinese cities. “Militarized Tokyo,” another proposed exhibit, would discuss the role of the capital in Japan’s war effort (1993).
The accompanying memorial would also convey a conciliatory tone by simultaneously mourning those killed in the Tokyo air raids and the “worldwide victims of the war” (Tôkyô-to 1993, 17; my translation).

Confusion of Tragedies

In 1996 the derailment of the Tokyo Peace Museum’s construction began. In that year, another gubernatorial task force, the Tokyo Metropolitan Peace Memorial Museum Construction Committee, received an unexpected announcement from the governor’s office, now headed by Aoshima Yukio, a former comedian and Japanese Diet member who, upon assuming office in 1995, curtailed the TMG’s spending binge in order to bring the city’s budget into line with the economic realities of Japan’s continued recession (Itoh 1999). The governor’s office revealed to the committee its plan to build the museum in Yokoami Park, the public space dedicated to preserving the memory of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. The park’s small size, however, required a radical downsizing of the museum, with the exhibit space cut from 2,000 to 900 square meters and the auditorium eliminated. Even with this reduction, the governor’s office claimed that space constraints within the park required the partial demolition of Reconstruction Commemoration Hall. The city proposed merging the two surviving outer walls of that structure, along with its exhibits about the earthquake, with the new museum (Tôkyô-to 1998).

Following the announcement, a chorus of opposition arose from dissenting committee members, air-raid survivors, bereaved families, local residents, and architectural historians (as 1997c). Many voiced concern that Yokoami Park could not accommodate the memorialization of two separate catastrophes. Given the scale of suffering experienced on the site in 1923, claimed committee member and air-raid survivor Hashimoto Yoshiko, not enough room was left to represent another tragedy. Yokoami Park, “a sacred space for the victims of the Great Kanto Earthquake,” Hashimoto claimed, was “where we mourn those who died in 1923, a place where we think about that disaster” (Tôkyô-to 1998, 36; my translation).

Thereafter, longtime Tokyo Peace Museum proponents allied themselves with a group of architects to lobby the TMG to preserve Reconstruction Commemoration Hall and find a more suitable location for the museum (as 1997b). In response, the governor’s office developed a plan that simply heightened tensions: It would build Tokyo’s twenty-first-century symbol of peace underground in Yokoami Park in order to keep the existing memorial structures intact. Although activists labored for over two decades to build the Tokyo Peace Museum, they now found themselves uniting in October 1997 to form a group—led mainly by women who had either experienced the Great Tokyo Air Raid or lost family members in it—that vigorously lobbied the TMG to halt its plans to construct the museum in Yokoami Park. Over the course of the next two years the group conducted signature drives, held public meetings, and regularly petitioned the TMG to build the museum in one of the area’s larger metropolitan parks. Additionally, the group pressed the TMG to build a separate charnel house outside Yokoami Park for the air-raid victims’ cremated remains (TDKHHTK 2001).
As protests against the construction of the Tokyo Peace Museum in Yokoami Park continued, a local manifestation of a national backlash by conservatives against the message promoted by Japan’s peace museums erupted. The opposition was led by conservative members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly and a public intellectual well known for his efforts to combat what conservatives viewed as a “Tokyo War Crimes Trial” version of history that found Japan bearing responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War.

Just as liberal control of the metropolitan assembly had forced Governor Suzuki to plan the Tokyo Peace Museum in the early 1990s, conservative recapture of the assembly later that decade constituted a central part of this backlash. During a 1997 Assembly Education Committee meeting, for example, the newly elected Assemblyman Tsuchiya Takayuki charged that Communist and Socialist party assemblymen had stacked the Tokyo Peace Museum’s exhibit design committee with individuals sympathetic to their leftist orientations. He then raised a formal objection to the proposed exhibits before the entire assembly, claiming that they would dishonor the many Japanese soldiers who died on the Asian continent during the war by positioning them as ruthless aggressors rather than heroes who fought for the liberation of Asia from European colonialism (as 1997a).

Tsuchiya allied himself with Fujioka Nobukatsu, a professor of education at Tokyo University who came to prominence for his role as a founder of the Advancement of a Liberal View of History Study Group, which conservatives formed as a reaction against some public school history textbooks containing descriptions of Japanese atrocities committed during the country’s military engagements in Asia (Nelson 2003). “The people that does not have a history to be proud of,” wrote Fujioka in response to the textbooks, “cannot constitute itself as a nation” (Fujioka 1996, 30, translated in McCormack 2000, 53).

Acutely aware of the role of museums in transmitting history and instilling a sense of group identity, Fujioka also took a strong position against the message conveyed in Japan’s peace museums. Although he could only protest the exhibit contents of existing museums, he could act to prevent the Tokyo Peace Museum from being built altogether. Beginning in late 1997 Fujioka carried out a full-court press to generate public opposition to the museum by giving lectures throughout the capital, writing opinion pieces for conservative newspapers, meeting with Governor Aoshima to urge him to postpone construction, and forming a group called Citizens Concerned about Peace in Tokyo that carried out protests in Yokoami Park (Fujioka 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).

Mirroring his critique of certain textbooks, Fujioka asserted that the Tokyo Peace Museum’s proposed exhibits promoted an “anti-Japanese” and “self-masochistic” historical viewpoint (1998b, 7; my translation). The “Path to the Tokyo Air Raids” exhibit and its discussion of Japan’s invasion of other Asian countries generated most of his concern. Representing Japan’s involvement in Asia as an act of aggression—a debatable matter, according to Fujioka—would “trample on the hearts of children and exert mind-control over them” by causing museum visitors...
to conclude that the destruction of Tokyo was nothing more than just retribution for Japan’s actions on the Asian continent (Fujioka 1998b, 7; my translation).

Importantly, Fujioka appropriated some of the long-standing concerns of Tokyo air-raid survivors by calling on the TMG to construct a memorial and separate charnel house for air-raid victims outside Yokoami Park. While Tokyo was building those structures, Fujioka argued, citizens could debate the contents of the Tokyo Peace Museum’s proposed exhibits (Fujioka 1998c). By and large, however, air-raid survivors actively opposing construction in Yokoami Park believed that a museum with exhibits that discussed Japanese aggression in Asia was essential. When, for example, air-raid survivors and bereaved family members gathered at a public meeting hall to discuss their opposition to the TMG’s plan, they were surprised to find Fujioka on the panel and proceeded to argue with him about their “different historical perspectives” (TDKHTK 2001, 35; my translation).

In March 1999 the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, citing concern over the controversy surrounding the exhibits, passed a resolution requiring its approval before the governor could commence construction of the museum. The resolution also declared that the memorial for Tokyo’s air-raid victims henceforth should be considered separately from the museum and that it be built without delay in Yokoami Park. Contrary to the original plan, the resolution proscribed any mention of “worldwide victims of the war” on the memorial and allowed references only to “air-raid victims,” “mourning,” and “peace” (TT 1999a; my translations). The death knell for the Tokyo Peace Museum sounded in August 1999 when another assembly resolution froze its construction altogether and reiterated the demand that the memorial be built immediately (TT 1999b). Two months later, newly elected Governor Ishihara Shintarô, a conservative known for inflammatory nationalist and xenophobic statements who, as a candidate, had refused to support construction of the Tokyo Peace Museum, moved forward to build the memorial in Yokoami Park. Simultaneously, those citizens most active in the movement to remember the Tokyo air raids, writing that they had “lost this one battle to those who affirmed and glorified Japan’s war of aggressions,” began to work toward the construction of a private resource center to serve as a substitute for the peace museum (THKKS 2002, 22; my translation).

Spaces of Literal and Exemplary Memory

Applying Todorov’s ideal types of literal memory and exemplary memory to this case study provides a useful theoretical lens through which to understand the political dimensions of representing catastrophic loss in the urban landscape (1996). According to Todorov, literal memory involves a singular focus on the one catastrophe being remembered. Exemplary memory, on the other hand, contains an explicitly ethical and cosmopolitan dimension through its simultaneous focus on the local catastrophic event being remembered and on other events of suffering. By creating “a model to understand new situations with different agents” (p. 14), exemplary memory becomes linked “to justice and better relations with others” (Hoskins 2007, 247). The application of these ideal types to actual places of memory can help researchers further un-
derstand the intended functions, limits, and possibilities of a particular memorial site. Regarding this case study, it becomes apparent that, although citizens’ groups attempted to construct an exemplary space of memory by linking the suffering experienced in the Tokyo air raids to the experience of suffering by other groups on the Asian continent, the TMG opted to create a literal space of memory.

This is evidenced in the way in which the TMG has attempted to graft Tokyo air-raid memories onto the commemorative space for the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. Because the TMG could not claim a Hiroshima- and Nagasaki-like exclusivity of experience in representing the catastrophic deaths associated with the Tokyo air raids, it instead reverted to the representational trope of heroic death. The normative power of memorials, “at once reflecting and reproducing social ideas about the past, and thereby shaping their future” (Dwyer and Alderman 2008, 167), is evidenced here through the declamatory strategy presented on the dedication plaque next to the memorial. In addition to mourning the dead, the purpose of the Dwelling of Remembrance is “to remind succeeding generations that today’s peace and prosperity was built on the sacrifices of many precious lives.”

Although state sanctification of a space associated with catastrophic loss often represents the deaths of civilians as a sacrifice made for a greater good, it is instructive to examine the notion of sacrifice as related to those killed in the Tokyo air raids (Foote 2003). The inherent danger of literal memory, wrote Todorov, is that it “renders the event impossible to go beyond [and] comes back in the last analysis to submitting the present to the past” (1996, 14). Applying this concern to the Dwelling of Remembrance monument, the wording on the dedication plaque suggests a return to the prewar and wartime state-promulgated notion of the Japanese people as imperial subjects who are expected to embrace an unquestioning ethic of self-sacrifice in the name of the emperor and the country. This approach, however, runs counter to the postwar concept of the Japanese people as a collection of self-aware, autonomous citizens from which certain forms of civil society originate (Barshay 1998).

An important conclusion to draw from this case study is that, although public memory stems from a “fluid process of negotiation” (Till 1999, 254), attempts to create sites of exemplary memory will meet resistance, largely due to the fact that “the national paradigm continues to reign supreme” in relation to the production of historical memory (Conrad 2003, 85). This tendency makes the endeavor—realized or not—to establish such sites all the more remarkable and worthy of greater attention.

Note
1. Following convention, I place Japanese surnames before given names.

References


———. 1999b. 1999 nen hachi gatsu yÔka no togikai bunkô iinkai ni togawa kara shimesaretara monyûmento kensetsu ni can suru hôshin (Metropolitan Government’s Policy regarding Monument Construction—Announced in Metropolitan Education Committee Meeting of 8 August 1999), 8 August.


